Is Romney A Secret Porn Pervert?

The Mittster has a reissued campaign pledge to rally behind. He wants to restrict all Americans from viewing porn, in the privacy of their own homes. He is making this issue a rallying cry to his fellow GOP perverts, too!

I suspect that The Mittster is a closet porn pervert, and is now making it a campaign pledge to fight against. It is like those closet GOP homosexuals who play footsies in public airport bathrooms with unknown stallmates, yet seem to carry the anti-gay torch in the Congress.

Now we have another torch-carrier against porn and it has materialized in Mitt Romney! So, now we have to wonder if Mitt is a closet porn viewer.

There are soooooo many other issues to carry a torch on the behalf of, such as unemployment, child homelessness, undocumented worker indentured servitude, wage stagnation, campaign finance reform, outsourcing, tax avoidance, etc., but The Mittster has taken on pornography. Is there something interesting with this picture? He wants to make sure that all new computers sold won't be able to open up porn sites. That is his big American issue.

Whatever happened to the GOP's big problem with government interference into the lives of Americans? Well, it appears it doesn't apply to Americans viewing porn sites. So much for hypocrisy. In reality, the GOP loves to interfere in the privacy lives of Americans in spite of what they say publicly. They love to spy, in their imaginations, into the bedrooms of Americans!! They just don't want interference into the lives of GOP business practices, such as fraud, outsourcing, tax evasion, tax havens, or tax avoidance.

So many of the GOPers must be perverts, too!!

So, is Mitt Romney a secret porn pervert? Maybe!!

(http://eye-on-washington.blogspot.com)

Mitt Romney Is A Sociopath

So much is unfolding over Mitt Romney and it is not good. Mitt and Ann Romney are predators, as well as full-blown sociopaths : A person with a personality disorder manifesting itself in extreme antisocial attitudes and behavior and a lack of conscience. Being deacon in the Mormon Church and its number one personality, has not seemed to raise the voices—audibly and publicly—of fellow church members over their top two senior perverts as they travel across the country lying about themselves and others.

Ann recently came out saying that “you people” don’t need to know more about our tax returns. No Ann, we don’t? Ann, you and your husband want to move into the White House and run the country. Mitt has said nothing about how he would do it other than to slash and burn during his first week as president, and create a Scorched Earth-style administrative agenda that would hurt the 99% and reward the 1%. And, he keeps telling us to ‘trust him’ because he was a successful businessman, and that he knows just how to run the country---predator style.

What Mitt and Ann know how to do best is lie, and fake it. They got rich by being destroyers. As the owner, president, CEO, and chairman of Bain Capital Investment and LLC, as well as sole stockholder, they bought wounded American companies and “Zombied” them to death by sucking the life and soul out of them, firing workers, selling off assets, bankrupting the businesses, and writing off the debts, while earning big fat fees and profits for themselves.

What the Romneys did with their new found gains by writing off these dead companies, and selling off the assets was to invest in offshore accounts located in tax havens, and Swiss bank accounts pretending to be “foreigners” (investment information was never sent back to the home country) so as to avoid the heavier tax burden found in the United States. In addition, they found ways to avoid U.S. taxes, such as saying their horse was a medical expense for his wife, which amounted to around $7000.00!

Such antics can only be done by the billionaires, of which the Romneys are a club member. They are the ultra-elite. They aren’t just elitists, which their ilk label Democrats as being, but are in actuality—super elitists. They refer to the hardworking, everyday folks as “YOU PEOPLE”. They are bigots of the “every-person”.

The Romneys don’t want any exposure of their predatory behavior as owners of Bain Capital, or of their secretive tax returns. They cover up the truth by lying.

Mitt appears to have faked and lied about exactly when he stopped running, advising, signing off on documents, ruling, and approving decisions made at Bain while away in Utah playing chief for the U.S. Olympic Committee, and while prepping for his run to the Massachusetts Governor’s mansion. The SEC seems to be interested in these documents, as well, since he said he had “retired” from Bain in 1999, but documents prove otherwise showing he was directly involved into 2001 and 2002.

The Romneys have stated that, yes, they are millionaires, but their publicly suppressed tax returns might show that they are really billionaires, who may have found sweet tax loopholes to squeeze into, and lower tax rates to latch on to.

Did they ever pay zero taxes? Did they work out a tax rate below 10%? Were they serious tax avoiders?

Do Americans want such a person as their president? Do Americans feel that since they must pay taxes on income that cannot be sheltered, or moved offshore, that millionaires and billionaires should, at the very least, pay the same tax rates as they do, or even more? I know they do!!

Do Americans believe, that at the very least, a presidential contender needs to reveal fully transparent tax returns? I am sure they do.

Sleazegate Romney has shown to be King Midas sitting on his piles of gold, while the rest of us see him as the wannabe emperor with no clothes.

Sleazegate Romney doesn’t take responsibility for anything! He deflects. In this regard, he is like LilboyBush, who when asked if he would have done anything differently during his 8-years, he couldn’t think of a single fucked over and failed decision to reverse. Not even to turn right-side-up the book, My Pet Goat, as 9/11 was taking place, while he sat dumbfounded in that kindergarten classroom.

All LilboyBush as to say about his presidency was that it was “awesome, and powerful”. How pitiful!

Romney has the gall to go after Obama’s youthful indiscretions as a high schooler and college student, yet Sleazegate Romney fails to understand that his vicious bullying, while a college student makes his pot just as black as the kettle. This further validates that Romney is a pervert and sociopath. His bullying and meanness harmed others and left those individuals involved regretting their contribution as Romney accomplices. Whatever drugs Obama smoked did not affect anyone but himself. Romney is just too disturbed and dysfunctional to get it.

Romney believes that college is out there for ya’ to grab hold of. All you have to do is borrow from your parents, even if your parents are struggling as a result of a poor economy, unemployment, outsourcing, and the actions of the GOP and complicit Democrats. Not every American can attend college on Daddy’s dollar like Willard Mitt Romney was able to do. Sleazegate Romney has no compassion, or understanding, or empathy because he IS a sociopath.

If Romney’s premise is that the rich need socialism in the form of the lowest tax rates in history (don’t forget government contracts) in order to become “job creators”, then why did Romney send his wealth offshore creating even more personal wealth and not keep it in the United States to be used to create jobs? It is because he doesn’t believe that lower tax rates create jobs. On the contrary, the facts show that higher tax rates do create millions of new jobs, and not the reverse.

Romney may be a billionaire with multiple homes and a Cadillac in every garage, but as a human being he is incompetent!

We are closing in on the RNC’s big convention day, and Sleazegate will follow the Mittster onto center stage. I bet the GOP is very concerned about their guy-by default- dragging a big ball and chain behind him. Especially, Ann Coulter.

(http://eye-on-washington.blogspot.com) 

77% of JP Morgan’s Net Income Comes from Government Subsidies

From Washingtonsblog.com

JP Morgan Sucks at the Government Teat

JP Morgan’s credit rating would be much lower without government backing.

As Bloomberg noted last week:

JPMorgan benefited from the assumption that there’s a “very high likelihood” the U.S. government would back the bank’s bondholders and creditors if it defaulted on its debt, according to the statement. Without the implied federal backing, JPMorgan’s long-term deposit rating would have been three levels lower and its senior debt would have dropped two more steps, Moody’s said.

And as the editors of Bloomberg pointed out a couple of weeks ago:

JPMorgan receives a government subsidy worth about $14 billion a year, according to research published by the International Monetary Fundand our own analysis of bank balance sheets. The money helps the bank pay big salaries and bonuses. More important, it distorts markets, fueling crises such as the recent subprime-lending disaster and the sovereign-debt debacle that is now threatening to destroy the euro and sink the global economy.

***

With each new banking crisis, the value of the implicit subsidy grows. In a recent paper, two economists — Kenichi Ueda of the IMF and Beatrice Weder Di Mauro of the University of Mainz — estimated that as of 2009 the expectation of government support was shaving about 0.8 percentage point off large banks’ borrowing costs. That’s up from 0.6 percentage point in 2007, before the financial crisis prompted a global round of bank bailouts.

To estimate the dollar value of the subsidy in the U.S., we multiplied it by the debt and deposits of 18 of the country’s largest banks, including JPMorgan, Bank of America Corp. and Citigroup Inc. The result: about $76 billion a year. The number is roughly equivalent to the banks’ total profits over the past 12 months, or more than the federal government spends every year on education.

JPMorgan’s share of the subsidy is $14 billion a year, or about 77 percent of its net income for the past four quarters. In other words, U.S. taxpayers helped foot the bill for the multibillion-dollar trading loss that is the focus of today’s hearing. They’ve also provided more direct support: Dimon noted in a recent conference call that the Home Affordable Refinancing Program, which allows banks to generate income by modifying government-guaranteed mortgages, made a significant contribution to JPMorgan’s earnings in the first three months of 2012.

Way to suck at the government teat, Mr. self-proclaimed free market champion.

http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2012/07/77-of-jp-morgans-net-income-comes-from-government-subsidies.html

22 Democrats in Senate Voted Against Food Stamps

From the Huffington Post:

The Senate overwhelmingly rejected a bid to preserve some $4.5 billion in food stamps funding, as part of the massive farm bill, on Tuesday.

The amendment to keep that spending in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, offered by Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.), failed 33 to 66. Sixty votes were needed to pass.

Gillibrand had hoped to prevent food aid cuts in the $969 billion bill by trimming the guaranteed profit for crop insurance companies from 14 to 12 percent and by lowering payments for crop insurers from $1.3 billion to $825 million.

"Half of the food stamp beneficiaries are children, 17 percent are seniors, and unfortunately now 1.5 million households are veteran households that are receiving food stamps," Gillibrand said, referring not just to heat-and-eat participants, but the broader population of food stamp recipients.


"...Congress has grown increasingly concerned about spending for the food stamp program. Some 26 million Americans received the aid in 2007, while more than 44 million received it last year, at a cost of $76 billion. The Congressional Budget Office estimated recently that demand will continue to grow through 2014 in the wake of the recession..."


The House has proposed even steeper cuts. The 2013 budget resolution passed by the lower chamber calls for $134 billion in cuts over 10 years. The House Agriculture Committee's version of the farm bill would slash $33 billion over 10 years.
***********************
Congress should not be concerned that the food stamp program cost $76 billion. It SHOULD be concerned that 44 MILLION Americans needed food stamps in 2007. That is just shy of one sixth of the U.S. population. The numbers are increasing.


Congress and Big Business, Big Agriculture, Big Pharma et. al. want to sacrifice the well-being of many for lining the pockets of the few.


Just look at WHO voted Nay in regards to providing food resources to people in need. Many of those Democrats are from poor states where unemployment is significant and low wage earners need food stamp support.


The United States is beginning its full-blown austerity program. As Paul Krugman stated on the Colbert Report: we are headed in the same direction as Ireland, especially if Romnibot becomes president.
**********************************


U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 112^th Congress - 2^nd Session

as compiled through Senate LIS by the Senate Bill Clerk under the direction of the Secretary of the Senate

Vote Summary

Question: On the Amendment (Gillibrand Amdt. No. 2156 As Modified )
Vote Number:	135	Vote Date:	June 19, 2012, 06:35 PM
Required For Majority:	1/2	Vote Result:	Amendment Rejected
Amendment Number:	S.Amdt. 2156 to S. 3240 (Agriculture Reform, Food, and Jobs Act of 2012)
Statement of Purpose:	To strike a reduction in the supplemental nutrition assistance program and increase funding for the fresh fruit and vegetable program, with an offset that limits crop insurance reimbursements to providers.

Vote Counts:	YEAs	33
	NAYs	66
	Not Voting	1

Vote Summary

By Senator Name

By Vote Position

By Home State

Alphabetical by Senator Name

Akaka (D-HI), Yea Alexander (R-TN), Nay Ayotte (R-NH), Nay Barrasso (R-WY), Nay Baucus (D-MT), Nay  Begich (D-AK), Yea Bennet (D-CO), Nay  Bingaman (D-NM), Nay Blumenthal (D-CT), Yea Blunt (R-MO), Nay Boozman (R-AR), Nay Boxer (D-CA), Yea Brown (D-OH), Yea Brown (R-MA), Yea Burr (R-NC), Nay Cantwell (D-WA), Yea Cardin (D-MD), Yea Carper (D-DE), Nay Casey (D-PA), Yea Chambliss (R-GA), Nay Coats (R-IN), Nay Coburn (R-OK), Nay Cochran (R-MS), Nay Collins (R-ME), Nay Conrad (D-ND), Nay Coons (D-DE), Yea Corker (R-TN), Nay Cornyn (R-TX), Nay Crapo (R-ID), Nay DeMint (R-SC), Nay Durbin (D-IL), Nay Enzi (R-WY), Nay Feinstein (D-CA), Yea Franken (D-MN), Nay

Gillibrand (D-NY), Yea Graham (R-SC), Nay Grassley (R-IA), Nay Hagan (D-NC), Nay Harkin (D-IA), Nay Hatch (R-UT), Nay Heller (R-NV), Yea Hoeven (R-ND), Nay Hutchison (R-TX), Nay Inhofe (R-OK), Nay Inouye (D-HI), Nay Isakson (R-GA), Nay Johanns (R-NE), Nay Johnson (D-SD), Nay Johnson (R-WI), Nay Kerry (D-MA), Yea Kirk (R-IL), Not Voting Klobuchar (D-MN), Nay Kohl (D-WI), Nay Kyl (R-AZ), Nay Landrieu (D-LA), Nay Lautenberg (D-NJ), Yea Leahy (D-VT), Yea Lee (R-UT), Nay Levin (D-MI), Yea Lieberman (ID-CT), Yea Lugar (R-IN), Nay Manchin (D-WV), Nay McCain (R-AZ), Nay McCaskill (D-MO), Nay  McConnell (R-KY), Nay Menendez (D-NJ), Yea Merkley (D-OR), Yea Mikulski (D-MD), Yea

Moran (R-KS), Nay Murkowski (R-AK), Yea Murray (D-WA), Yea Nelson (D-FL), Nay Nelson (D-NE), Nay Paul (R-KY), Nay Portman (R-OH), Nay Pryor (D-AR), Nay Reed (D-RI), Yea Reid (D-NV), Yea Risch (R-ID), Nay Roberts (R-KS), Nay Rockefeller (D-WV), Yea Rubio (R-FL), Nay Sanders (I-VT), Yea Schumer (D-NY), Yea Sessions (R-AL), Nay Shaheen (D-NH), Yea Shelby (R-AL), Nay Snowe (R-ME), Yea Stabenow (D-MI), Nay Tester (D-MT), Nay Thune (R-SD), Nay Toomey (R-PA), Nay Udall (D-CO), Nay Udall (D-NM), Yea Vitter (R-LA), Nay Warner (D-VA), Nay Webb (D-VA), Nay Whitehouse (D-RI), Yea Wicker (R-MS), Nay Wyden (D-OR), Yea

Vote Summary

By Senator Name

By Vote Position

By Home State

Grouped By Vote Position

YEAs ---33
Akaka (D-HI) Begich (D-AK) Blumenthal (D-CT) Boxer (D-CA) Brown (D-OH) Brown (R-MA) Cantwell (D-WA) Cardin (D-MD) Casey (D-PA) Coons (D-DE) Feinstein (D-CA)	Gillibrand (D-NY) Heller (R-NV) Kerry (D-MA) Lautenberg (D-NJ) Leahy (D-VT) Levin (D-MI) Lieberman (ID-CT) Menendez (D-NJ) Merkley (D-OR) Mikulski (D-MD) Murkowski (R-AK)	Murray (D-WA) Reed (D-RI) Reid (D-NV) Rockefeller (D-WV) Sanders (I-VT) Schumer (D-NY) Shaheen (D-NH) Snowe (R-ME) Udall (D-NM) Whitehouse (D-RI) Wyden (D-OR)

NAYs ---66
Alexander (R-TN) Ayotte (R-NH) Barrasso (R-WY) Baucus (D-MT) Bennet (D-CO) Bingaman (D-NM) Blunt (R-MO) Boozman (R-AR) Burr (R-NC) Carper (D-DE) Chambliss (R-GA) Coats (R-IN) Coburn (R-OK) Cochran (R-MS) Collins (R-ME) Conrad (D-ND) Corker (R-TN) Cornyn (R-TX) Crapo (R-ID) DeMint (R-SC) Durbin (D-IL) Enzi (R-WY)	Franken (D-MN) Graham (R-SC) Grassley (R-IA) Hagan (D-NC) Harkin (D-IA) Hatch (R-UT) Hoeven (R-ND) Hutchison (R-TX) Inhofe (R-OK) Inouye (D-HI) Isakson (R-GA) Johanns (R-NE) Johnson (D-SD) Johnson (R-WI) Klobuchar (D-MN) Kohl (D-WI) Kyl (R-AZ) Landrieu (D-LA) Lee (R-UT) Lugar (R-IN) Manchin (D-WV) McCain (R-AZ)	McCaskill (D-MO) McConnell (R-KY) Moran (R-KS) Nelson (D-FL) Nelson (D-NE) Paul (R-KY) Portman (R-OH) Pryor (D-AR) Risch (R-ID) Roberts (R-KS) Rubio (R-FL) Sessions (R-AL) Shelby (R-AL) Stabenow (D-MI) Tester (D-MT) Thune (R-SD) Toomey (R-PA) Udall (D-CO) Vitter (R-LA) Warner (D-VA) Webb (D-VA) Wicker (R-MS)

Not Voting - 1
Kirk (R-IL)

Vote Summary

By Senator Name

By Vote Position

By Home State

Grouped by Home State

Alabama:	Sessions (R-AL), Nay	Shelby (R-AL), Nay
Alaska:	Begich (D-AK), Yea	Murkowski (R-AK), Yea
Arizona:	Kyl (R-AZ), Nay	McCain (R-AZ), Nay
Arkansas:	Boozman (R-AR), Nay	Pryor (D-AR), Nay
California:	Boxer (D-CA), Yea	Feinstein (D-CA), Yea
Colorado:	Bennet (D-CO), Nay	Udall (D-CO), Nay
Connecticut:	Blumenthal (D-CT), Yea	Lieberman (ID-CT), Yea
Delaware:	Carper (D-DE), Nay	Coons (D-DE), Yea
Florida:	Nelson (D-FL), Nay	Rubio (R-FL), Nay
Georgia:	Chambliss (R-GA), Nay	Isakson (R-GA), Nay
Hawaii:	Akaka (D-HI), Yea	Inouye (D-HI), Nay
Idaho:	Crapo (R-ID), Nay	Risch (R-ID), Nay
Illinois:	Durbin (D-IL), Nay	Kirk (R-IL), Not Voting
Indiana:	Coats (R-IN), Nay	Lugar (R-IN), Nay
Iowa:	Grassley (R-IA), Nay	Harkin (D-IA), Nay
Kansas:	Moran (R-KS), Nay	Roberts (R-KS), Nay
Kentucky:	McConnell (R-KY), Nay	Paul (R-KY), Nay
Louisiana:	Landrieu (D-LA), Nay	Vitter (R-LA), Nay
Maine:	Collins (R-ME), Nay	Snowe (R-ME), Yea
Maryland:	Cardin (D-MD), Yea	Mikulski (D-MD), Yea
Massachusetts:	Brown (R-MA), Yea	Kerry (D-MA), Yea
Michigan:	Levin (D-MI), Yea	Stabenow (D-MI), Nay
Minnesota:	Franken (D-MN), Nay	Klobuchar (D-MN), Nay
Mississippi:	Cochran (R-MS), Nay	Wicker (R-MS), Nay
Missouri:	Blunt (R-MO), Nay	McCaskill (D-MO), Nay
Montana:	Baucus (D-MT), Nay	Tester (D-MT), Nay
Nebraska:	Johanns (R-NE), Nay	Nelson (D-NE), Nay
Nevada:	Heller (R-NV), Yea	Reid (D-NV), Yea
New Hampshire:	Ayotte (R-NH), Nay	Shaheen (D-NH), Yea
New Jersey:	Lautenberg (D-NJ), Yea	Menendez (D-NJ), Yea
New Mexico:	Bingaman (D-NM), Nay	Udall (D-NM), Yea
New York:	Gillibrand (D-NY), Yea	Schumer (D-NY), Yea
North Carolina:	Burr (R-NC), Nay	Hagan (D-NC), Nay
North Dakota:	Conrad (D-ND), Nay	Hoeven (R-ND), Nay
Ohio:	Brown (D-OH), Yea	Portman (R-OH), Nay
Oklahoma:	Coburn (R-OK), Nay	Inhofe (R-OK), Nay
Oregon:	Merkley (D-OR), Yea	Wyden (D-OR), Yea
Pennsylvania:	Casey (D-PA), Yea	Toomey (R-PA), Nay
Rhode Island:	Reed (D-RI), Yea	Whitehouse (D-RI), Yea
South Carolina:	DeMint (R-SC), Nay	Graham (R-SC), Nay
South Dakota:	Johnson (D-SD), Nay	Thune (R-SD), Nay
Tennessee:	Alexander (R-TN), Nay	Corker (R-TN), Nay
Texas:	Cornyn (R-TX), Nay	Hutchison (R-TX), Nay
Utah:	Hatch (R-UT), Nay	Lee (R-UT), Nay
Vermont:	Leahy (D-VT), Yea	Sanders (I-VT), Yea
Virginia:	Warner (D-VA), Nay	Webb (D-VA), Nay
Washington:	Cantwell (D-WA), Yea	Murray (D-WA), Yea
West Virginia:	Manchin (D-WV), Nay	Rockefeller (D-WV), Yea
Wisconsin:	Johnson (R-WI), Nay	Kohl (D-WI), Nay
Wyoming:	Barrasso (R-WY), Nay	Enzi (R-WY), Nay

Vote Summary

By Senator Name

By Vote Position

By Home State

Fukushima-SPF4 May Be At Risk Of Fire

From Washingtonsblog.com

Estimating the Potential Impact of Failure of the Fukushima Daiichi Unit 4 Spent Fuel Pool

Posted on June 12, 2012 by WashingtonsBlog

Dr. Paul Gailey sent me the following email:

Because so many claims were flying around with regard to Fukushima’s spent fuel pool number 4, we performed a technical analysis of the situation to gain some perspective on the parameters of the crisis. If you are interested, there is a link to our Special Report on Fukushima at www.holophi.ch/blog/ , along with some overview perspectives in our April newsletter also at that web address.

Our analysis is done in a way that is difficult to dispute because we based everything on published scientific reports and measurements and performed the analysis in a straightforward way. While the many anecdotal radiation measurements and reports by members of the public may very well be accurate and important, we felt there was a need for a scientifically defensible analysis that did not depend on public measurements, which are difficult to substantiate and can be easily criticized.

Dr. Gailey holds advanced degrees in physics and engineering. An associate professor of Physics and Astronomy at Ohio University (with joint appointments in the Departments of Biology and Mathematics), Dr. Gailey is also a member of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences Committee on Global Science and Technology, the Director of Electric and Magnetic Fields Health Effects at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and a researcher in health effects, instrumentation, computational models, and economic impact of electric and magnetic field effects for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. He is a biophysicist (the world’s top experts on the effects of radiation on health are biophysicists).

Gailey’s new report notes that the risk of a fire in fuel pool number 4 is real, and that the risks of contamination are so severe that an international effort is required.

The report follows (original pdf version here).

Holophi Special Report – April 2012

Estimating the Potential Impact of Failure of the Fukushima Daiichi Unit 4 Spent Fuel Pool

A Local Problem for Japan or a Global Mega Crisis?

Paul C. Gailey, Ph.D. , President& CEO, Holophi CHAGwww.holophi.ch

Abstract

Extreme opinions are being voiced about the risk of global catastrophe resulting from a possible collapse of the Fukushima Daiichi unit 4 spent fuel pool. These claims are appearing mostly among the public through internet media and other non-official channels. Officials sources remain largely mute on the subject or downplay the risks. This report provides an approximate bounding of the risks using available data. The results of this analysis suggest that a nominal release of 10% of the SFP 4 inventory of cesium and strontium would represent 3-10 times the March 2011 release amounts, substantially increasing risk levels in Japan and impacting marine life. Release of 100% of the SFP 4 inventory, or 30-100 times the March 2011 release amounts, could result in significant global impact.

Introduction

More than a year after earthquake and tsunami that devastated areas of Japan in 2011, new alarms are being sounded concerning the state of the unit 4 spent fuel pool (see Note 1). Although the unit 4 reactor was not operating at the time of the tsunami, its fuel was being stored, along with a large quantity of spent fuel assemblies, in a pool within the unit 4 building. This building was seriously damaged by a hydrogen explosion. The spent fuel pool, which is located about 30 meters above ground, is considered to be in danger of collapsing.

The infrastructure for moving the fuel assemblies was rendered inoperable by the explosion, and high radiation levels make it extremely difficult to clear debris, perform repairs, or construct a new system for removing the assemblies. The cooling system for the spent fuel pool was also destroyed by the explosion, and Tepco has positioned temporary hoses to pump water into the pool for cooling. They have also installed steel pillars to help support the pool.

1

Reason for Concern

The unit 4 spent fuel pool (SFP) contains 1300-­‐1500 spent and active fuel assemblies. Because the structure of the unit 4 building was damaged by an explosion, the spent fuel pool is in danger of collapsing. If the pool collapses or develops serious cracks allowing the cooling water to drain, the fuel rods will be exposed to the environment. These concerns are elevated by a recent report that additional large earthquakes (magnitude 7) are expected in the area (Tong et al., 2012).

Spent fuel pools are not protected in the same way as reactor cores, and the unit 4 building is seriously damaged. Thus, there is no obvious second line of defense protecting the environment from the radioactive fuel and secondary isotopes if water cooling is lost. Together, the fuel rods currently produce about one megawatt (MVV) or more of waste energy in the form of heat (see Note 2) even though they are not operating in a reactor. This heat must be removed through the use of cooling water to avoid damage to the fuel rods including possible melting, fire, explosions and release of radioactive material.

If cooling water for the spent fuel pool is lost – either by collapse of the pool, formation of cracks in the pool, or other factors – a major release of radioactive material could result. Given the large amount of heat generated by the fuel rods, the temperature would rise quickly. These rods are surrounded by zirconium cladding, and at high temperatures, this cladding catalyzes hydrogen production, can generate additional heat, and even explode and burn (NRC, 2006).

The water surrounding the fuel rods in the spent fuel pools serves two purposes: First, it conducts heat away from the fuel assemblies to avoid overheating. Second, it provides shielding from the extremely high radiation levels near the rods. If a collapse or breakage of the unit 4 spent fuel pool occurs, the loss of shielding by the cooling water could critically increase radiation levels in the entire Daiichi complex. High radiation is already a serious problem limiting worker and even robot access to the plant to perform repairs and mitigation, and to maintain cooling of the other spent fuel pools and reactors. Thus, a catastrophic failure of the unit 4 spent fuel pool could potentially cascade into additional releases from the other spent fuel pools and reactors.

Estimated Amounts of Radioactive Material

Operation of a nuclear plant produces a number of radioactive isotopes. For this preliminary potential impact analysis, we will focus primarily on cesium, strontium, and plutonium, while noting that other radioisotopes are also of concern. Cesium and strontium are easily absorbed in plants and animals similarly to potassium and calcium, respectively. Their movement through the biosphere and long half lives (years to decades) mean that they represent substantial health hazards at relatively low concentrations. Plutonium is not as soluble and easily distributed in the environment, but is extremely carcinogenic when inhaled or ingested.

2

Because the various isotopes are produced by nuclear reactions during the operation of the reactors, the quantities present in the fuel rods must be estimated from calculations and measurements. For this analysis, we will use the estimated amounts below (Mertyurek et al., 2010, Pretzsch et al., 2011). If improved estimates are identified, the results of the analysis below can be easily scaled based on the new data.

Unit 4 Spent Fuel Pool

Total number of fuel assemblies *	1331 – 1535*
Tons of heavy metal	228
Estimated Cs-137	1018 Bq
Estimated Cs-134	1018 Bq
Estimated Sr-90	6·1017 Bq
Estimated Pu-238 thru 241†	1016 Bq

* Reports differ on this number, e.g. CNSC reports 1331 spent fuel assemblies + 204 new assemblies for a total of 1535 fuel assemblies. However, the 15% difference between these numbers is not critical for this analysis.

† Uranium fuel, after use in a reactor (when spent) become ~1% plutonium. We used example isotope ratios to estimate activity, reducing Pu-241 activity by a factor of 100 to reflect its lower mortality risk relative to the other Pu isotopes (Peterson et al., 2007).

Total for all Daiichi reactors and SFP’s (including common fuel storage pool)

Total number of fuel assemblies	~11,400
Tons of heavy metal	~1950
Estimated Cs-137	1019 Bq
Estimated Cs-134	1019 Bq
Estimated Sr-90	6·1018 Bq
Estimated Pu-238 thru 241‡	3·1017 Bq

‡ Some assemblies included MOX fuel which contains a higher percentage of plutonium.

Base Case Scenario: Collapse or breakage of SFP 4 leads to release of 10% of contained isotopes into atmosphere (2% falling on Japan and the remaining 8% falling on the Pacific Ocean)

The total Cs-137 released in this scenario is 10¹⁷ Bq (100 PBq) or three to ten times the amount released during the peak discharges of March 2011. A value of 2% falling on Japan (20% of total release) is comparable to the percentage calculated to have fallen on Japan during the March 2011 release (Buesseler et al., 2012).

3

The total Cs-137 land deposition in Japan would be 2·10¹⁶ Bq for a total Cs (137+134) fallout of approximately 4·10¹⁶ Bq. Total Sr-90 is expected to be 1.2·10¹⁸ Bq, and total Pu isotopes are approximately 6·10¹⁴ Bq. However, we note that during the March 2011 release, a very small fraction of less than 0.01% of Pu inventory appears to have been released, compared to 3.5% of inventory released during the Chernobyl disaster (Zheng et al., 2012). The difference may have been due to the mode of release (explosion vs. burning in the case of Chernobyl). For Pu isotopes, we use here a total release of 0.1% of inventory as the mechanisms of release that could occur in a unit 4 SFP disaster can not be predicted.

We will use two bounding approaches to interpret these numbers:

Even distribution of the isotopes over the land area of Japan (~4·1011 sq m)
Cesium distribution on land	— 100,000 Bq/m2
Soil contamination due to Cesium*	— 2000 Bq/kg
Strontium distribution on land	— 30,000 Bq/m2
Soil contamination due to Strontium**	600 Bq/kg
Plutonium distribution on land	5 Bq/m2

* using a conversion coefficient of 50 kg/m2 similar to that reported by Yasunari et al., 2011

** no conversion coefficient was found for strontium, so value for cesium is used as a first approximation

Distribution of isotopes on land estimated by comparison to March 2011 release *
Area in East Fukushima prefecture and around Fukushima NPP
Cs-137 + Cs-134	12000 – 40,000 Bq/kg
Sr-90	3600 – 12,000 Bq/kg
Pu isotopes**	3 – 10 Bq/kg
Neighboring Prefectures
Cs-137 + Cs-134	1500 – 5000 Bq/kg
Sr-90	450 – 1500 Bq/kg
Pu isotopes**	0.4 – 1.25 mBq/kg
Tokyo Prefecture
Cs-137 + Cs-134	600 – 2,000 Bq/kg
Sr-90	180 – 600 Bq/kg
Pu isotopes**	0.15 – 0.5 mBq/kg

* Scaling results of Yasunari et al., 2011 using ratio of 10% of SFP 4 isotope inventory estimates above to March, 2011 release amounts

** Scaling measurement results of Zheng et al., 2012 using Cs-137/Pu deposition ratio of 2·10⁶

4

Ocean Contamination (base case with 8% of SFP 4 inventory falling on ocean)

Ocean Contamination for uniform distribution over 500 km x 500 km area
Cs-137 + Cs-134 Surface Deposition	640,000 Bq/m2
Cs-137 + Cs-134 Volume Concentration*	6400 Bq/m3
Large marine life bioaccumulation**	— 1200 Bq/kg
Ocean contamination based on scaling of Buesseler et al., 2012 results for March 2011 release
Near-shore Cs-137 + Cs-134∆	210 – 8000 Bq/m3
Off-shore Cs-137 + Cs-134‡	6 – 1400 Bq/m3
Large marine life bioaccumulation**	360 Bq/kg

* Using 100 m mixing depth

** Using bioaccumulation factor of —180 for Thunnus alalunga near Japan from Rowan and Rasmussen, 1994.

∆ Using 7000 – 80,000 Bq/m2 typical range from Buesseler et al., 2012 with 100 m mixing depth

‡ Using 200 – 14,000 Bq/m2 typical range from Buesseler et al., 2012 with 100 m mixing depth

Discussion of Base Case Scenario Results

The most important factor in a bounding exercise of this type is the estimate of total isotopes in the unit 4 SFP and percentage released. Determination of these amounts is complicated by the fact that the isotopes other than uranium are produced during reactor operation and the amounts vary depending on reactor operating conditions, position of a rod in the reactor and along the rod, and storage time following operation. We believe the above inventory values represent reasonable first order estimates, but they are critical to the analysis and should be modified if additional information is identified.

The unit 4 SFP was generating about 2 MW of waste heat in March 2011. This amount is decreasing with time but likely remains above 1 MW at this time (see Note 2). If cooling water is lost either by collapse of the pool or development of a large crack and water leak, the temperature of the fuel assemblies will quickly rise. The zirconium cladding on the fuel rods begins to crack at about 1200 C, and oxidation begins at 1300 C. Oxidation of the cladding in the presence of steam results in an exothermic reaction producing 5.8 MJ/kg of Zr, which can add to the heating of the fuel and also produce hydrogen.

5

The course of events following a loss of cooling water is unknown and depends on many factors. Radioactivity releases from the Fukushima Daiichi reactors so far appear to have resulted from a number different processes. For example, the very low plutonium releases (possibly 100,000 times less than Chernobyl as a fraction of plutonium present), suggest that it resulted from shattering of fuel rods during the hydrogen explosions (Zheng et al., 2012). The prolonged fires at Chernobyl may have volatilized plutonium by heating.

Although the unit 4 reactor does not use MOX fuel, plutonium is created as a by product of reactor operation and spent fuel is about 1% plutonium isotopes. Extensive studies have been performed to determine the rates and mechanisms of plutonium volatilization (Gelbard et al., 2003). The fraction of plutonium aerosolized can vary over a wide range depending on temperature, air flow, the presence of water vapor, and other factors. Thus, the plutonium values measured from the March 2011 release may or may not be representative of any future events. As noted above, fully 3.5% of plutonium fuel at Chernobyl was released during that crises.

Data on Cs-137 releases and deposition from the March 2011 release is becoming increasingly available as noted earlier. Although measurements have focused on Cs-137, we included Cs-134 in the estimates above as it presents similar hazards and is produced in similar amounts during reactor operation. We note, however, that Cs-134 has a shorter half life of only 2 years and thus levels are some 30% lower a year later.

An additional release event, such as a unit 4 SFP failure, would obviously not result in uniform distribution of radio nucleotides over Japan. These calculations were included as a bounding exercise as it is impossible to predict how cesium and other isotopes would be transported and distributed by the weather. Our second approach using data based on the March 2011 release represents a weather scenario that actually occurred, but is unlikely to occur in precisely the same way again. In evaluating the potential impact of a SFP 4 failure, it is important to recognize that weather patterns could result in either more or less land distribution than occurred in March 2011.

These two approaches both indicate that a SFP 4 failure could present serious country­wide problems for Japan. The current limits for cesium soil contamination in Japan are 5000 Bq/m³. The results above suggest that this limit could be exceeded over large areas and would likely be further exacerbated by Sr-90 contamination. Little work on Sr-90 contamination from the March 2011 release has been published, but it is an important and hazardous material that is rapidly absorbed by plants and animals. We also note that the contamination levels predicted above for a SFP 4 failure would be added to existing soil and ocean contamination levels, both from the March 2011 release and other sources.

Pacific ocean contamination represents an even more complex problem because it involves not only weather patterns but ocean currents and mixing as well. The rough estimates presented above are meant only as an initial bounding exercise, but do indicate that the ocean should not be considered an infinite sink for radioactive waste.

6

The results of Buesseler et al., 2012 suggest that ocean contamination resulting from the March 2011 release should not present an immediate hazard either for humans or the ocean environment. However, that paper does not address the greater bioaccumulation that occurs in larger fish, or the effects of other important isotopes such as strontium.

Cesium and strontium, in particular, move easily through sea life and Cs-137 and Sr-90 decay slowly with half lives on the order of 30 years. If a SFP 4 failure occurs, the above estimates suggest that significant amounts of these isotopes could be added to the amounts already present from atmospheric testing and the March 2011 Fukushima release. Impacts on human health, the ocean environment, and fishing industries need to be considered.

The biological impact of ingested radioactive materials varies according to the isotope. Risk coefficients for ingestion of Cs-137 and Cs-134 are about 3·10^-11 per pCi or 8·10^-10 per Bq (Peterson et al., 2007). This means, for example, that if 100 million people each consume an additional 100,000 Bq of radioactive cesium, an additional 8000 cancer deaths are expected. The levels of ocean contamination estimated above remain generally less than natural levels of Potassium-40 activity (about 12,000 Bq/m³). However, each ingested radiation source adds to internal exposure and contributes to overall risk. Thus, a finding that added contamination levels are less than natural levels should not be interpreted as an indication of no risk.

Other Scenarios

The sequence of events that might follow a failure of SFP 4 is difficult to determine because so many different factors of geometry, heat dissipation, and age of the fuel rods can affect the outcome. Analytical tools and modeling programs for this purpose have been developed by governments, but appear to be classified and unavailable to the public (NRC, 2006). Because of the high level of heat generation and the presence of the zirconium cladding, it is possible that a radiological fire could ensue.

The risk of a radiological fire decreases as the time since removal of the fuel from the reactor increases. The most recent fuel rods in SFP 4 were removed from the reactor in late 2010 indicating that risk of a radiological fire is substantially reduced compared to March 2011 when the earthquake and tsunami occurred. However, heat production likely remains quite high due to the large number of fuel assemblies and close packing within SFP 4. The positioning of the fuel rods would also change unpredictably in a collapse of the fuel pool making it difficult to rule out the possibility of conditions that could lead to a radiological fire.

7

If a radiological fire develops and further cooling is impossible, more than 10% of the radioactive material of SFP 4 could be released. Results for the base case scenario above can be directly scaled to estimate the impact of a larger percentage release.

Release of 100% of the cesium, strontium, and other isotopes would scale the base case results by a factor of ten and would clearly present a dire situation for areas of Japan, marine life in the Pacific ocean, and the global environment. A release of 100% of the SFP 4 cesium and strontium from SFP 4 would represent a 30 – 100 times larger release than occurred in March 2011.

Loss of shielding provided by the pool water would also result in extremely high radiation levels in the immediate area. Such extreme radiation levels can make it impossible for human workers or robots to enter the area and attempt cooling operations or other mitigation strategies. Concerns have further been raised that high radiation levels from a SFP 4 failure may prevent access and maintenance to the nearby common fuel pool and the rest of the Daiichi nuclear plant. The total inventory of radioisotopes at the plant is roughly an order of magnitude greater than the SFP 4 inventory.

Conclusions

The risk of radiological fire and a major radioactivity release decreases as time passes and the waste heat output of the SFP 4 inventory declines. Whether or not a radiological fire would occur during a rapid loss of cooling water or a collapse of the pool is impossible to determine with certainty because of the many unknowns. Government agencies and national laboratories, which have developed detailed models for such situations, may be able to provide a reasonable estimate of probabilities. However, we have not been able to locate any such analysis for the current situation even though more than a year has passed since the March 2011 explosions and radiation releases.

Given available information, the most reasonable assumption is that a radiological fire remains possible. Based on spent fuel heat decay curves, the fuel in SPF 4 is probably still producing more than 1 MW of waste heat that is not easily dissipated without cooling water. A radiological fire would likely result in a major release of radioactive isotopes as there is currently no significant barrier between SFP 4 and the environment. The exact amount of material that would be volatilized and/or released into the ocean is also impossible to determine.

A high risk of large earthquakes in the coming months along with the extremely damaged and unstable state of the reactor 4 building mean that the potential modes of a SFP 4 failure are unknown. Would a large crack occur, leading to sudden loss of cooling water but with the pool walls remaining largely intact, impeding heat dissipation? Or would the pool collapse leading to a disordered and unpredictable configuration of the fuel assemblies as they fall some 30 meters?

8

We can conclude at this point only that the potential exists for severe additional contamination of Japan, parts of the Pacific ocean, and other parts of the world due to atmospheric and ocean transport. If there is no further damage to SFP 4 before fuel removal, or if damage occurs but cooling is maintained and radiological fires or hydrogen explosions are avoided, releases of radioactive material may be minimal. According to media reports, work to remove the SFP 4 radioactive material is currently scheduled for late 2013.

The situation is thus one of undetermined event risk, but extreme consequences if the event does occur (the event being SFP 4 failure with radiological fire or other mode of major radioactivity release). This event risk may be substantial based on available information. Depending on the nature of the failure, the consequences could be mainly confined to Japan and nearby ocean areas, or could extend to varying degrees of global impact. The former case is relevant for release of a small percentage of SFP 4 inventory while the latter case would result following a substantial percentage release from SFP 4 and possibly additional releases from surrounding inventory at the Daiichi plant.

Our recommendations based on this bounding analysis are as follows:

1. Governments and other organizations with advanced modeling capabilities should immediately conduct an analysis of SFP waste heat levels and the possibility of radiological fire in the event of SFP 4 failure, and make the results publicly available.
2. If there is still a significant possibility of radiological fire and large additional releases of radioactive material within the coming months, immediate action should be taken to accelerate removal and/or protection of the SFP 4 contents. Although the technical challenges of such an operation are enormous, the potential impact of a failure is great enough that international resources should be quickly mobilized to address this issue.
3. Industries potentially affected by major additional radioactivity releases in Japan should draw up contingency plans to prepare for the impact of further events. If an earthquake or other event results in SFP 4 collapse, events will unfold very quickly leaving no time for emergency planning.
4. Members of the public, particularly in Japan and the U.S., should pressure authorities to perform accurate and honest assessments of risks, to prepare plans to handle further earthquakes or other damage to SFP 4 and the rest of the plant, and to accelerate mitigation activities.

In closing, we note that the above analysis is a rough estimation of potential impact in lieu of in-depth, detailed analyses from official agencies. It addresses only the SFP 4 question and does not discuss ongoing problems with other reactor cores at the site. We also did not include the numerous unpublished radiation measurements performed by the public and others. These measurements may well represent important findings, but are not suitable for inclusion in a bounding analysis of this type until verified.

9

Although we reviewed a number of papers discussing worldwide fallout from the March 2011 event, we did not directly estimate impact to other countries in this report. There are so many variables associated with transport of radioactive material that we felt it most useful to focus on Japan and nearby areas of the Pacific ocean. Official reports and published papers so far are generally not reporting substantial impact of the March 2011 release on other countries. As additional results are published, or at the request of our clients, we may revisit this issue in a future report

References:

Alvarez R, et al., Reducing the Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Reactor Fuel in the United States, Science and Global Security, 11:1-51, 2003

American Nuclear Society Special Committee on Fukushima, Fukushima Daiichi: ANS Committee Report (including Appendices), March 2012. Available fromhttp://fukushima.ans.org .

Argonne National Laboratory, Spent Fuel, Information Sheet, April 2011.

Buesseler KO, et al., Fukushima-derived radionuclides in the ocean and biota offJapan, Proceedings of the National Academies of Sciences, PNAS 2012 109(16)5984-5988 (published ahead of print April 2, 2012)

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, CNSC Fukushima Task Force Report, INFO-0824, October 2011

Eckerman KF, Leggett RW, Nelson CB, Puskin JS, Richardson ACB, Cancer Risk Coefficients for Environmental Exposure to Radionuclides, Federal Guidance Report No. 13, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA 402-R-99-001, September 1999.

El-Jaby, A (Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission), Fukushima Daiichi NPP Event and Associated Radioactive Source Term – CNSC’s Initial Response, Presentation at WNU Summer Institute, 2011 (8×8 rod assemblies, 13.9 cm x 13.9 cm, 208 kg fuel, 103 kg Zircaloy cladding

Gelbard F, Murata KK, and McClellan Y (Sandia National Laboratories), A Review of Plutonium (Pu) Combustion Releases in Air for Inhalation Hazard Evaluation, Sandia Report SAND2003-3253, 2003.

Lujaniene G, Bycenkiene S Povinec PP, and Gera M, Radionuclides from the Fukushima accident in the air over Lithuania: measurement and modeling approaches, J of Envr. Radioactivity, in press, available online December 27, 2011.

Makhijani, A (Institute for Energy and Environmental Research), Post-Tsunami Situation at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan: Facts, Analysis, and Some Potential Outcomes, March 16, 2011

Mertyurek U, Francis MW, Gauld IC (Oak Ridge National Laboratory), SCALE 5 Analysis of BWR Spent Nuclear Fuel Isotopic Compositions for Safety Studies, ORNL/TM-2010/286, December 2010.

__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 10

Holophi CH AG Special Report on Fukushima Daiichi SFP 4 © - April, 2012

;

;

Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology-Japan, Results of the Nuclide Analysis of Plutonium and Stronium by MEXT, September 30, 2011

National Research Council of the National Academies, Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage: Public Report, , ISBN: 0-309-10511-0, 2006. Available from National Academies Press,http://www.nap.edu;catalog/11263.html .

Nuclear Regulatory Commission ML011870535 Appendix 1, Thermal Hydraulics of Spent Fuel, 2000

Peres, AC and Hiromoto, G, Determination of Screening Level for Soil Radioactive Contamination, Proc. Annual Intl Conf on Soils, Sediments, Water and Energy, 12(1): Chapter 20, 2010

Peterson J, MacDonell M, Haroun L, Monette F (Argonne National Laboratory, Environmental Science Division), Radiological and Chemical Fact Sheets to Support Health Risk Analyses for Contaminated Areas, Argonne National Laboratory, 2007.

Pretzsch G, Hannstein V, Wehrfritz M, Radioactive Inventory at the Fukushima NPP, Eurosafe, 2011. Available at:

www.eurosafe-forum.org/userfiles/21%20paperRadioact%20inventory%20FukushimaPretzsch19102011.pdf

Rowan DJ and Rasmussen JB, Bioaccumulation of Radiocesium by Fish: the Influence of Physicochemical Factors and Trophic Structure, Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci 51:2388-2410, 1994.

Sailor VL, Perkins KR, Weeks JR, and Connell HR, Severe Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools in Support of Generic Safety, Issue 82, Brookhaven National Laboratory, NUREG/CR-4982,1987.

Thompson, MA (Dow Chemical Co.), Oxidation and Ignition of Plutonium, RFP-491, 1966

Tong P, Shao D, and Yang D, Tomography of the 2011 Iwaki earthquake (M7.0) and Fukushima nuclear power plant area, Solid Earth, 3:43-51, 2012

Wakeford, R, And now, Fukushima, J. Radiol. Prot., 31:167-176

Wetherbee GA, Debey TM, Nilles MA, Lehmann CMB, Gay DA (U.S. Geological Survey), Fission Products in National Atmospheric Deposition Program, Open File Report 2011-1277, 2011.

www.World-nuclear.org, (Site provides a range of data and analysis regarding the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant and 2011 disaster

Yasunari TJ, et al., Cesium-­137 deposition and contamination ofJapanese soils due to the Fukushima nuclear accident, PNAS 108(49):19530-19534, 2011.

Zheng J, et al., Isotopic evidence of plutonium release into the environment from the Fukushima DNPP accident, Scientific Reports, 2:304, DOI: 10.1038/srep00304, 2012.

__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 11

Holophi CH AG Special Report on Fukushima Daiichi SFP 4 © - April, 2012

Notes:

Note 1: Following is an example of concern raised about this issue on an Internet site (akiomatsumura.com/2012/04/682.html ).

Japan’s former Ambassador to Switzerland, Mr. Mitsuhei Murata, was invited to speak at the Public Hearing of the Budgetary Committee of the House of Councilors on March 22, 2012, on the Fukushima nuclear power plants accident. Before the Committee, Ambassador Murata strongly stated that if the crippled building of reactor unit 4—with 1,535 fuel rods in the spent fuel pool 100 feet (30 meters) above the ground—collapses, not only will it cause a shutdown of all six reactors but will also affect the common spent fuel pool containing 6,375 fuel rods, located some 50 meters from reactor 4. In both cases the radioactive rods are not protected by a containment vessel; dangerously, they are open to the air. This would certainly cause a global catastrophe like we have never before experienced. He stressed that the responsibility of Japan to the rest of the world is immeasurable. Such a catastrophe would affect us all for centuries.

Note 2: Spent nuclear fuel waste heat decreases with time. According to World-nuclear and other sources, the waste heat generated by SFP 4 in spring 2011 was between 2 MW and 3 MW. The precise decay rate for this waste heat is difficult to determine because of the many isotopes present, the varying ages (relative to date of removal from the reactor), and the particular history of the fuel rods within the reactor. Fuel rod waste heat decays nominally from about 10 kW per tonne at one year after removal to 1 kW per tonne at ten years (www.fukushima.ans.org, www.world-nuclear.org). Depending on the heat decay rate applied, the current waste heat production is likely between 0.5 MW and 1.5 MW as of April 2012. Various agencies and organizations have detailed information on the fuel rod history and computational models capable of making more precise estimates.

_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 12

Holophi CH AG Special Report on Fukushima Daiichi SFP 4 © - April, 2012

(http://eye-on-washington.blogspot.com)